

**TOP SECRET**

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[redacted] CONTENTS

25X1A

ok

1. SITUATION ON THE TURKISH-SYRIAN BORDER [redacted]

25X1A

no

25X1A

25X1A

no

ok

4. BRITISH TO MOVE AGAINST OMANI REBELS ON 15 NOVEMBER [redacted]

25X1A

ok

5. INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS LEAD IN JOGJAKARTA ELECTIONS [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

ok

6. SITUATION IN LAOS [redacted]

no-yesterday

7. USSR PROPOSES EXCHANGE OF SCIENTISTS WITH JAPAN

25X1A

25X1A

ok

8. HONDURAS THREATENED BY REVOLUTION [redacted]

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## 1. SITUATION ON THE TURKISH-SYRIAN BORDER

25X1A Comment on:

The beginning of Turkish maneuvers has resulted in renewed Syrian charges that a Turkish attack is imminent. The maneuvers, apparently on a relatively small scale, now are scheduled to continue until 15 November. They are being conducted primarily by ground forces although there will be some practice coordination with air-support units.

Following the maneuvers, the Turks are expected to withdraw to their permanent duty stations all forces not regularly assigned to the Syrian border area. One F-86 squadron, deployed near the Syrian border in September, 25X1A has already returned to its home base in northern Turkey.

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
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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#### 4. BRITISH TO MOVE AGAINST OMANI REBELS ON 15 NOVEMBER


25X1A Comment on:



Britain plans to provide military support for the Sultan of Muscat's foray against the newly active Omani rebels scheduled to begin on 15 November.

A few aircraft from Aden will reinforce locally based planes and armored cars in their attempt to ensure the seizure of a rebel village and perhaps capture Talib, the principal rebel leader. London hopes that a successful operation would increase the Sultan's prestige and encourage a rebel chief, Suleiman bin Himyar, to come to terms with the Sultan. The British have earlier reported that Suleiman is disgusted with Talib and considering negotiating with the Sultan.

The British have been concerned over Talib's regaining the initiative in Muscat as a result of his seizure of the village of Tanuf on 17 October, and are anxious lest the rebels increase in strength and cause other villages to waver in their loyalty to the Sultan.



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## 5. INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS LEAD IN JOGJAKARTA ELECTIONS

### 25X1A Comment on:

[REDACTED] The Indonesian Communists have taken what appears to be a commanding lead in early returns from the central Java sultanate of Jogjakarta, where the last of Java's local elections was held on

7 November. The major non-Communist parties--the Nationalist party, Masjumi, and Nahdlatul Ulama--follow in that order. These results are in line with Communist gains registered in local elections since late June which have given the Communist party a larger electoral base than any other political organization in Java.

The Communist party has been deeply involved in the anti-Dutch campaign in support of Indonesia's claim to Netherlands New Guinea. President Sukarno has called for the severance of trade relations with the Netherlands if the area is not "returned" to Indonesia, and has also suggested the confiscation of all Dutch property in Indonesia.

Communists and left-wingers apparently have been among Sukarno's major advisers in formulating the anti-Dutch drive. The Jogjakarta election results, if the present trend continues, will further convince Sukarno that he is right in bringing Communists into high government positions. [REDACTED]

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## 6. SITUATION IN LAOS

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25X1A Comment on:

Prime Minister Souvanna hopes to present a coalition government, including representatives of the Communist Pathet Lao, for investiture

on 16 November.

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25X1 he will request that a special session of the National Assembly convene on 15 November, at which time the Pathet Lao would formally surrender control of the two northern provinces. He would then present for investiture a government headed by him in which Pathet leaders Souphannouvong and Phoumi would receive the portfolios of reconstruction and religion, cabinet posts which would involve the Communists in national affairs on a wide front.

The prime minister asserted that the Independent party, Laos' second largest, had agreed to this timetable. If true, this would confirm tentative indications that Phoui Sananikone, leader of the Independents, was preparing to drop his opposition to the proposed settlement. Under the circumstances, Crown Prince Savang would be isolated in his opposition to a settlement with the Pathets, and would probably feel forced to accede to the government's request for a special session of the assembly.

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## 7. USSR PROPOSES EXCHANGE OF SCIENTISTS WITH JAPAN

25X1A      Comment on:




Japanese Prime Minister Kishi probably will find it difficult to block an exchange of scientists which has been proposed "very recently" by the USSR.

The Soviet offer is likely to have strong appeal in Japanese scientific circles which include persons who have won international prominence in the field of theoretical physics.

The proposal apparently is timed to take advantage of the new Soviet scientific prestige to promote closer Soviet-Japanese relations. The influential Japan Science Council, which has a strong leftist minority and acts in a semiofficial advisory capacity to the government in scientific matters, is reported to have recommended acceptance of the Soviet proposal and would handle the actual exchange. One of the major functions of the council is to assist in formulating Japan's nuclear energy policies.

The exchange of scientists probably would strengthen those Japanese scientists, industrialists, and political leaders who advocate drawing on the Sino-Soviet bloc as well as the free world in developing the nation's atomic industry.



## 8. HONDURAS THREATENED BY REVOLUTION

25X1A Comment on:



The aged General Tiburcio Carias, powerful chief of the Honduran Nationalist party and dictator of Honduras for 16 years before 1949, seems determined to prevent the Liberal

party, which received 61 percent of the votes in the 22 September constituent assembly election, from coming to power even if it means revolution.

Carias told Nicaraguan President Somoza that under no circumstances will he "allow" the popular Liberal leader, Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, to become president and asked Somoza to help him prevent it. Although help will probably not come from Somoza, Carias may be receiving money from Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, who would like to make the Caribbean area his sphere of influence. With sufficient financial backing, Carias could cause serious trouble. He probably could not, however, gain effective control of the country, which gave his party only 32 percent of the votes in the election.

The country is still ruled by a military junta, pending the constituent assembly's completion of its work. Colonel Oswaldo Lopez, ambitious defense minister, may seize on any outbreak of political violence to justify continued military rule. Liberal leaders, miffed by Carias' flat rejection of their conciliatory offer that would have given the Nationalists three cabinet posts in the new government, may precipitate trouble by instructing the Liberal majority in the assembly to name Villeda constitutional president immediately. They had intended to delay this until after agreement was reached for Nationalist participation in the government.

